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6	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
7	United States of America	
8	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
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10	EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
11	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	CASE NO. 2:21-CR-44-JAM
12	Plaintiff,	STIPULATION TO CONTINUE STATUS CONFERENCE AND EXCLUDE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND
13	v.	
14	TYSON FARRELL,	ORDER
15	Defendant.	DATE: June 29, 2021 TIME: 9:30 a.m.
16		COURT: Hon. John A. Mendez
17	This case was set for a status conference on June 29, 2021. By this stipulation, the parties	
18	request that the Court continue the status conference to August 24, 2021, and to exclude time under	
19	Local Code T4, as well under the Court's General Orders, for the reasons set forth below.	
20	On April 17, 2020, this Court issued General Order 617, which suspends all jury trials in the	
21	Eastern District of California scheduled to commence before June 15, 2020, and allows district judges to	
22	continue all criminal matters to a date after June 1. This and other General Orders, both previous and	
23	subsequent, were entered to address public health concerns related to COVID-19.	
24	Although the General Orders address the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has	
25	emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act's end-of-justice provision "counteract[s] substantive	
26	openendedness with procedural strictness," "demand[ing] on-the-record findings" in a particular case.	
27	Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). "[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no	
28	exclusion under" § 3161(h)(7)(A). <i>Id.</i> at 507. Moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. <i>Id.</i> at	

509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record "either orally or in writing").

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which *Zedner* emphasizes as both mandatory and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, and 617 require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances are excludable only if "the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless "the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." *Id*.

The General Orders exclude delay in the "ends of justice." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance following Mt. St. Helens' eruption. *Furlow v. United States*, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. *Id.* at 767-68; *see also United States v. Correa*, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing *Furlow* to exclude time following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules.

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-of-justice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). ¹ If continued, this Court should designate a new date for the status conference. *United States v. Lewis*, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any pretrial continuance must be "specifically limited in time").

¹ The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make "additional findings to support the exclusion" at the judge's discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D. Cal. March 18, 2020).

STIPULATION

- 1. By this stipulation, the United States and defendant Eric Daniel Hancock, through his undersigned counsel, move to continue the status conference until August 24, 2021, and to exclude time between June 29, 2021, and August 24, 2021, under Local Code T4 and under the Court's General Orders.
 - 2. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
 - a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 110 pages of investigative reports in electronic form. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel or has been made available for inspection and copying. The government anticipates producing additional discovery in the near future as it becomes available.
 - b) Counsel for the defendant desires additional time to review the discovery, develop the case, conduct investigation, consult with her client, discuss potential resolution, and to explain the consequences and guidelines. There have been various delays in the evidence inspection because of out-of-town coordination for many schedules.
 - c) Defense counsel represents and believes that failure to grant additional time as requested would deny Mr. Hancock the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, considering the exercise of due diligence.
 - d) The government does not object to this continuance.
 - e) Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence
 - f) In addition to the public health concerns cited by General Order 611 and presented by the evolving COVID-19 pandemic, an ends-of-justice delay is particularly apt in this case because some of investigation defense counsel seeks has required travel around the state, which has been hampered by concerns for health and safety. Defense counsel and defense investigators have been encouraged to telework and minimize personal contact to the greatest extent possible, and to that end would be best served by delaying any investigation that could